Reinforcement of Lt. Gen. T.Y. Buratai’s “A Frank and Patriotic Advice on Nigeria’s Escalating Security Crisis”

By Hassan Abdullahi





Nigeria’s deepening security challenges continue to attract renewed policy and strategic debate among security experts and stakeholders, with growing calls for a shift from purely military responses to a more holistic national approach. In this context, Dr. Hassan Abdullahi, former Director of the Army Department at the Ministry of Defence, offers a critical reflection on the enduring relevance of Lt. Gen. Tukur Yusufu Buratai’s position titled, , “A Frank and Patriotic Advice on Nigeria’s Escalating Security Crisis,” he reiterated on the nature of Nigeria’s insecurity and the urgent need for comprehensive reforms…











Buratai’s central thesis is that Nigeria’s insecurity is protracted, political, and cannot be solved by the military alone. It demands national mobilization, governance reforms, and a shift from kinetic to holistic responses. Events from late 2024 through 2026 have confirmed this diagnosis.

1. Reinforcement: The Crisis is Protracted and Adaptive
Buratai’s view: “I said this insurgency may last longer… it is not something you just wish away. We need a long-term plan.”

Evidence 2025-2026:
– Resurgence in the North-West and North-Central: Aug 2025 saw 50 worshippers killed in Katsina and 15 killed in coordinated raids across 7 villages in Plateau’s Mangu LGA.
– Actor adaptation: Bandits and terrorists now collaborate across state lines, using kidnapping for ransom and political leverage. CDS Gen. Christopher Musa confirmed this operational synergy.
•Pattern: Each military offensive displaces groups temporarily, but without governance and policing, they reconstitute. This validates Buratai’s warning against short-term thinking.

2. Reinforcement: Insecurity has a Political Dimension
Buratai’s view: “This insecurity is essentially political… some politicians benefit from the activities of these terrorists.”

Evidence:
– CDS Musa stated publicly that “some individuals don’t want peace because when there is peace, the government is seen to be doing well”.
– Attacks spike around election cycles and in areas with weak local governance. The use of insecurity as a political tool has turned parts of the North-West into a shadow economy for war entrepreneurs.

3. Reinforcement: Over-reliance on the Military Weakens Civil Institutions.
Buratai’s view: “The extensive deployment of the Armed Forces in internal security perpetuates a cycle of dependency that weakens civil police capacity.”

Evidence:
– As of 2026, the Armed Forces are deployed in all 36 states.
– The Nigeria Police Force remains undermanned, underfunded, and unable to lead intelligence-led policing. Result: military overstretch, diversion of defence budgets to routine policing, and reduced readiness for external threats.
– This creates a cycle where the military becomes the default police, and the police never develop capacity.

4. Reinforcement: Whole-of-Society Mobilization Works
Buratai’s view: “We can lock down this country to deal with terrorists like we did for COVID-19. Mobilise everybody psychologically through social media, the press, and community action.”

Evidence:
– Nigeria’s COVID-19 and Maiduguri flood responses showed that when government, citizens, media, and private sector act together, results follow.
– Where community vigilance groups, traditional rulers, and local government are empowered and coordinated with security forces, attacks reduce. Where they are ignored, voids are filled by bandits.

Conclusion
Lt. Gen. Buratai’s analysis remains accurate. Nigeria’s security crisis is not primarily a firepower problem. It is a governance, political economy, and institutional capacity problem. Military force can contain and degrade threats, but without political will, functioning police, local governance, and youth inclusion, containment becomes permanent war. The cost is human lives, economic stagnation, and erosion of state legitimacy. The events of 2025-2026 have not contradicted Buratai’s advice; they have confirmed it.

Recommendations

1. Declare and Act on a National Security Emergency
– Establish a National Security Mobilization Council chaired by the President, with governors, traditional rulers, civil society, and private sector.
– Replicate the COVID-19 Presidential Task Force model for security, with clear targets, funding, and public reporting.

2. Rebalance Security Architecture
– Scale down military in internal policing: Transfer responsibility back to the Nigeria Police Force and NSCDC within 24 months.
– Invest in intelligence-led policing: Fund forensic labs, community policing, and real-time intelligence fusion centers at state level.
– Stop stretching the military: Return the Armed Forces to focus on territorial defense, counter-insurgency, and suppression of insurrection only when civil authority fails.

3. Address the Political Economy of Violence
– Audit and prosecute political actors found to be financing or enabling armed groups.
– Decouple local government funding from state control to improve grassroots governance and service delivery.
– Criminalize and dismantle illegal mining and arms trafficking networks that fund banditry.

4. Launch a Non-Kinetic Offensive
– Youth: Expand and fully fund skills acquisition, student loans, and entrepreneurship schemes. AMAC’s Phase 1 empowerment of 700 youth is a model to scale.
– Community: Institutionalize traditional rulers and community leaders in early warning and conflict resolution.
– Narrative:Run a national counter-radicalization campaign using media, religious leaders, and schools to delegitimize violent extremism.

5. Improve Governance in Contested Areas
– Re-establish civilian administration in ungoverned spaces through rapid deployment of civil servants, teachers, and health workers backed by mobile police units.
– Use GIS and data to track population movement and resource allocation in Phase 1 and other saturated districts.


Finally, Buratai’s advice is not pessimistic; it is realistic. The choice is between managing insecurity indefinitely with the military, or ending it by rebuilding the state’s capacity to govern, police, and include its people. The latter is harder, but it is the only durable solution.




Dr. Hassan Abdullahi is the former Director Army Department at the Ministry of Defence, Nigeria.